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Proponents of laissez-faire economic philosophy have long relied upon the concept of the “invisible hand” to
justify non-intervention by governments in markets. The term is typically interpreted to describe how the
independent actions of self-interested individuals can lead to a beneficial societal outcome. Since Adam Smith
introduced the concept in 1776, the invisible hand has become an important foundation of economic analysis
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neoclassical economic theories and the Chicago School of economic thought, the invisible hand has been
associated with the modern shift in emphasis from regulation to free market philosophy. However, the appeal
of the concept has somewhat diminished in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, with many blaming rising
income inequality and reduced social mobility on lax regulations and limited oversight of the financial sector.
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Virtual Competition: The Promise and 
Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy, 
by Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke1
ROBERT VAN DE MARK2
PROPONENTS OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY have long relied upon 
the concept of the “invisible hand” to justify non-intervention by governments 
in markets. The term is typically interpreted to describe how the independent 
actions of self-interested individuals can lead to a beneficial societal outcome.3 
Since Adam Smith introduced the concept in 1776, the invisible hand has 
become an important foundation of economic analysis and has consistently been 
a source of controversy, debate, and policy inspiration.4 As one of the core tenets 
of neoclassical economic theories and the Chicago School of economic thought, 
the invisible hand has been associated with the modern shift in emphasis from 
regulation to free market philosophy.5 However, the appeal of the concept has 
somewhat diminished in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, with many blaming 
rising income inequality and reduced social mobility on lax regulations and limited 
oversight of the financial sector.6 Particularly in the context of competition law, 
1. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2016).
2. JD/MBA Candidate (2019), Osgoode Hall Law School and the Schulich School of Business, 
Toronto, Canada.
3. Karen I Vaughn, “Invisible Hand” in John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman, eds, 
The Invisible Hand (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989) 168 at 170-71.
4. See e.g. Mark Thornton, “Cantillon and the Invisible Hand” (2009) 12:2 QJ Aus 
Econ 27 at 27-32.
5. Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 1 at 205.
6. Ibid.
Book Review
VAN DE MARK,  ViRTuAl COMpETiTiON 615
some experts question the effectiveness of the neoclassical model that created the 
merger-friendly environment of the 1990s, which contributed to many financial 
institutions becoming “too big to fail.”7 Naturally, some competition experts 
have begun to consider other rapidly evolving industries where application of 
traditional free market philosophy may lead to the creation of anti-competitive 
market dynamics and negative societal outcomes.
In Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven 
Economy, Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E. Stucke explore the transformative impact 
that “Big Data,” computer algorithms, artificial intelligence, and machine 
learning have had on competitive markets and overall consumer welfare. 
By examining two contradictory themes—the commonly accepted promise of 
a more competitive environment under the “algorithm-driven economy” and its 
less-discussed perils—Ezrachi and Stucke analyze the overarching effect that new 
technologies and market structures have on competition, privacy, democratic 
ideals, and overall consumer well-being. In particular, the authors attempt to 
demonstrate how new technologies are challenging traditional dynamics of 
competition and giving rise to an entirely new environment—one that displays 
the characteristics of competitive markets, but is driven by different forces. In the 
words of the authors, “[t]he good old invisible hand of competition, which 
safeguarded our welfare when we shopped in our local fruit market, is being 
displaced by the digitalized hand.”8 Given the presence of these distinct market 
forces, the authors argue that some type of intervention by regulators is necessary 
in order to preserve competitive markets and protect consumer privacy interests.
I. EXAMINING HIDDEN FORCES ON MODERN MARKETS 
CREATED BY THE USE OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES
Ezrachi and Stucke venture behind the “façade of virtual competition” 
by presenting three unique scenarios that demonstrate the newly emerging 
anti-competitive dynamics created by new technologies.9 In the first scenario, the 
authors address how algorithms and other advancing technologies can facilitate 
collusion and cartel activity. Ezrachi and Stucke describe the shift “from a world 
where executives expressly collude in smoke-filled hotel rooms” to one where 
pricing algorithms that allow firms to engage in tacit collusion are used to set 
7. Ibid at 22.
8. Ibid at 27.
9. Ibid at 2.
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the market price above an efficient level.10 In the second scenario, the authors 
suggest that firms are beginning to use advanced technology to engage in almost 
perfect behavioral discrimination. Powerful firms are collecting unprecedented 
amounts of information about individual consumers to exploit biases, use 
targeted advertising, and adjust prices to minimize consumer surplus.11 In the 
final scenario, the authors address a new competitive dynamic arising between 
major players in the digital ecosystem, which the authors refer to as a “Frenemy” 
relationship.12 This dynamic highlights the complexity of the online ecosystem 
where “super-platforms,” such as Google and Apple, have a disproportionate 
amount of power and influence over independent developers.13
These scenarios are each particularly compelling because they are not 
conjectural—competition authorities are actually dealing with these issues 
today—and the authors frequently contextualize their conceptual framework 
using real world examples. Beyond present day cases, the authors also provide 
a forward-looking perspective for each of the issues, presenting possible future 
developments in each scenario. While this type of information is naturally more 
theoretical, it assists the reader with understanding the potential negative impact 
of these developments on markets if left unchecked.
When outlining each scenario, Ezrachi and Stucke frequently compare and 
contrast each topic using traditional neoclassical economic theory and modern 
behavioural economic theory. The authors consistently argue that you cannot 
adequately understand the complexity of these competition issues by strictly using 
the lens of neoclassical economic analysis.14 While the authors make it clear they 
endorse the use of behavioural economics to view the issues through a “prism of 
fairness and equality,”15 the inclusion of competing theories provides readers with 
context regarding common counterarguments to the authors’ positions and how 
economic analysis has generally evolved over time.
The well-designed structure of the book also makes it easy for readers to 
understand the sometimes-technical information and critically assesses the 
authors’ arguments. At the end of each section, the authors provide a nuanced 
reflection of the material covered and outline the enforcement tools that currently 
exist across jurisdictions to address the issues raised. This structure puts readers 
10. Ibid at 36-37.
11. Ibid at 101-16.
12. Ibid at 145.
13. Ibid at 147-58.
14. For a discussion on the merits of behavioural discrimination examined using neoclassical and 
behavioural economic theory, see e.g. ibid at 119-21.
15. Ibid at 121.
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in a better position to evaluate different options when the authors ultimately 
provide recommendations near the conclusion of the book.
II. CONTRIBUTION TO MODERN COMPETITION LAW AND 
ANTITRUST THEORY
Virtual Competition provides a powerful theoretical cornerstone for future 
study of anti-competitive market dynamics caused by the use of increasingly 
sophisticated algorithmic technology. As the scenarios described in the book 
become increasingly commonplace, further research on the empirical effects of 
tacit collusion caused by the “digitalized hand” of the market will surely follow. 
As the authors note, one of the most important issues with anti-competitive 
market dynamics is the general lack of public and regulatory awareness. On the 
surface, online markets typically appear competitive with many pro-competitive 
attributes, such as lower search costs and fewer barriers to market entry.16 However, 
as the authors note, behind this “competitive veneer” new strategies powered by a 
complex web of algorithms are rapidly developing and maximizing firms’ profits, 
while at the same time harming societal welfare.17 Despite this, there is very 
little relevant discussion in the academic community: Leading competition law 
publications still do not directly address these changing dynamics.18 Additionally, 
the same firms responsible for creating these problems dominate the academic 
conversation about the state of competition in online markets. For example, 
when Google was facing intense antitrust scrutiny in 2011, the company 
made a major contribution to George Mason University’s Law and Economics 
Center and directly funded a number of academic studies.19 The result was the 
publication of a number of research papers defending Google and arguing that 
intense competition exists in the industry.20 Google was then able to forward these 
16. Ibid at 4-9.
17. Ibid at 203.
18. See e.g. Herbert Hovenkamp, Hovenkamp’s Federal Antitrust Policy, The Law of Competition 
and Its Practice, 5th ed (St Paul, Minn: West Academic, 2016); Cassandra Brown & Brian 
A Facey, Competition and Antitrust Laws in Canada: Mergers, Joint Ventures and Competitor 
Collaborations, 2nd ed (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2017).
19. David Dayen, “Google’s insidious shadow lobbying: How the Internet giant is bankrolling 
friendly academics–and skirting federal investigations,” Salon (24 November 2015), online: 
<www.salon.com/2015/11/24/googles_insidious_shadow_lobbying_how_the_internet_
giant_is_bankrolling_friendly_academics_and_skirting_federal_investigations/>.
20. See e.g. Joshua Wright, “Defining and Measuring Search Bias: Some Preliminary Evidence” 
(2011) Intl Center L & Econ at 49-51.
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studies on to policymakers in an attempt to justify their practices.21 This type of 
“intellectual capture” threatens the integrity of the regulatory environment and 
Ezrachi and Stucke expect it to become more prevalent in future years.22 Virtual 
Competition will hopefully inspire further independent study on lesser-known 
anti-competitive forces and the actions of major players in these industries.
Through this discussion, readers’ perspectives of algorithm-driven markets 
are likely to be challenged simply because the conclusions of the authors are 
counterintuitive. With price transparency at an all-time high and millions of 
options for applications only a tap away, there is clearly a powerful illusion of 
competition in digital markets. Those who read this book are likely to come 
away with a better understanding of the seriously overlooked negative market 
consequences of popular new technologies, the value of their own data, and the 
means by which competitive changes are negatively impacting consumer privacy 
protections.23 Virtual Competition will also hopefully increase public awareness of 
these issues and heighten pressure on competition authorities to modernize their 
practices. As noted by Ezrachi and Stucke, the ability of competition authorities 
to address many of these issues depends on how thoroughly they understand 
how these digital innovations are fundamentally changing market dynamics.24 
At present, it appears that many leading competition authorities may not even 
have the tools to handle these issues, further highlighting the need for additional 
empirical research on this topic.25
III. CONCLUSION
By shining light on the anti-competitive aspects of recent technological 
advancements, Virtual Competition addresses a wide range of timely issues and 
makes a major contribution to the field of competition law. Ezrachi and Stucke 
convincingly employ real world case studies and behavioural economic analysis 
to demonstrate the impact of newly emerging market dynamics. While strict 
proponents of neoclassical economics may disagree with how the Chicago School 
of economic thought is portrayed in this book, it will be hard for readers to 
escape the conclusion that the invisible hand may no longer be an entirely viable 
concept in an increasingly digitalized market universe.
21. Dayen, supra note 19.
22. Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 1 at 246-47.
23. Ibid at 176.
24. Ibid at 222.
25. Ibid at 218, 220-21.
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Virtual Competition should also provoke additional conversation and research 
on these consequential market shifts. As many of us—including laypeople and 
regulatory authorities—do not recognize the impact that these developments are 
already having on competition and consumer welfare, raising awareness right 
now is critical. Beyond empirical research, future studies could address a number 
of other unexplored topics that are touched upon by the authors. Notably, the 
authors raise a number of relevant ethical questions—such as the extent to 
which a human should be responsible for the actions of an algorithm they have 
programmed—that were not fully addressed because the questions fell outside 
the scope of the book.26 Hopefully, some of these questions will be explored in 
more detail by future researchers, so as to better understand how to approach 
enforcement and intervention in the markets.
In summary, Virtual Competition is a foundational piece in the emerging 
field of digital competition and provides a framework for future research. Ezrachi 
and Stucke utilize their novel concept of the “digitalized hand” to provoke readers 
to reconsider how their data is being used in an increasingly digitalized economy 
and demonstrate that data driven online markets will not necessarily correct 
themselves. In doing so, they challenge regulatory authorities to modernize their 
enforcement toolboxes and implement careful and measured intervention to 
safeguard consumer welfare and promote competitive market environments in 
the digital age.
26. Ibid at 78, 223.
